Keeping Up Appearances: Reputational Threat and Impression Management after Social Movement Boycotts by McDonnell, Mary-Hunter & King, Brayden G
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
9-2013
Keeping Up Appearances: Reputational Threat and
Impression Management after Social Movement
Boycotts
Mary-Hunter McDonnell
University of Pennsylvania
Brayden G. King
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Advertising and Promotion Management Commons, Business Administration,
Management, and Operations Commons, Business and Corporate Communications Commons,
Business Intelligence Commons, Management Information Systems Commons, Management
Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, Marketing Commons, Organizational Behavior and
Theory Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/327
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
McDonnell, M., & King, B. G. (2013). Keeping Up Appearances: Reputational Threat and Impression Management after Social
Movement Boycotts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 58 (3), 387-419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0001839213500032
Keeping Up Appearances: Reputational Threat and Impression
Management after Social Movement Boycotts
Abstract
In this paper, we show that corporate targets' responses to social movements are a function of impression
management to counteract perceived image threats created by movement tactics. An image threat occurs when
an organization‟s audiences or reference publics are given reason to doubt its reliability or claimed
conformity to socially acceptable behaviors, norms and values. We examine organizational responses to image
threats created by social movement boycotts. Consumer boycotts, while ostensibly trying to cause a decline in
a firm's sales revenue and force them to change a policy or practice, have a pronounced negative impact on
their targets' public images. Boycotts may elicit increased efforts by the firm to engage in positive impression
management and to reinforce positive audience perceptions. We argue that firms frequently use corporate
social actions as part of their image repertoire when dealing with the threat of boycotts. Corporate social
actions are especially likely to be used by firms that have built their reputation around being a "virtuous”
company. We draw on social movement theory and organizational theory to predict the conditions in which
firms will respond to boycotts with increased levels of social action. We use a dataset of boycotts that were
reported in major national newspapers from 1990 to 2005 to test our hypotheses.
Keywords
social movements, boycotts, media attention, impression management, prosocial claims, threat amplification,
nonmarket strategies
Disciplines
Advertising and Promotion Management | Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Business
and Corporate Communications | Business Intelligence | Management Information Systems | Management
Sciences and Quantitative Methods | Marketing | Organizational Behavior and Theory | Strategic
Management Policy
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/327
  
 
Keeping Up Appearances: Increased Corporate Social Activity in Response to 
Social Movement Activism  
 
Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell 
Kellogg School of Management 
Northwestern University 
2001 Sheridan Rd.; Evanston, IL; 60201 
mary-morris@kellogg.northwestern.edu 
(919) 923-2250 
 
Brayden King 
Kellogg School of Management 
Northwestern University 
2001 Sheridan Rd.; Evanston, IL; 60201 
b-king@kellogg.northwestern.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge Sarah Soule, Mayer Zald, Greta Hsu, Dave 
Whetten, Klaus Weber, and participants in seminars at Stanford University and the University of 
Michigan for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Word Count: 14635 
Key Words: social movements, boycotts, organizations, corporate social responsibility 
 
Keeping up Appearances 1 
 
Keeping Up Appearances:  
Increased Corporate Social Activity in Response to Social 
Movement Activism 
Abstract 
In this paper, we show that corporate targets‟ responses to social movements are a function of 
impression management to counteract perceived image threats created by movement tactics. An 
image threat occurs when an organization‟s audiences or reference publics are given reason to 
doubt its reliability or claimed conformity to socially acceptable behaviors, norms and values. 
We examine organizational responses to image threats created by social movement boycotts.  
Consumer boycotts, while ostensibly trying to cause a decline in a firm's sales revenue and force 
them to change a policy or practice, have a pronounced negative impact on their targets' public 
images. Boycotts may elicit increased efforts by the firm to engage in positive impression 
management and to reinforce positive audience perceptions. We argue that firms frequently use 
corporate social actions as part of their image repertoire when dealing with the threat of boycotts. 
Corporate social actions are especially likely to be used by firms that have built their reputation 
around being a "virtuous” company. We draw on social movement theory and organizational 
theory to predict the conditions in which firms will respond to boycotts with increased levels of 
social action. We use a dataset of boycotts that were reported in major national newspapers from 
1990 to 2005 to test our hypotheses. 
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A growing body of literature in organizational studies is dedicated to understanding the 
instigators of corporate social action, broadly defined as corporate activity that supersedes both 
legal mandates and the firm‟s narrow economic interests and is intended to promote  “social 
benefits or mitigate social problems for constituencies external to the firm” (Marquis, Glynn & 
Davis, 2007: 926).  Some scholars maintain that corporations are internally motivated to engage 
in social action due to the insurance-like properties attendant to perceived social responsibility 
(Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill & Hanson, 2009) or its potential long-term performance 
advantages (Burt, 1983).  A separate branch of research, however, links corporate social action to 
concerted pressure from external forces, such as social movements (Soule, 2009), local 
communities (Marquis, Glynn & Davis, 2007) or other stakeholders (Baron 1999; 2001; Carroll, 
1989; Clarkson, 1995; Freeman & Gilbert, 1987). This perspective historically emphasizes 
coercive pressure as the primary mechanism driving stakeholder influence (Davis, Whitman and 
Zald 2008; Bartley 2003; 2007).   
 
Given its focus on coercive mechanisms, it is unsurprising that research linking social movement 
activism to increased corporate social action has been dominated by issue-driven approaches that 
characterize social movement organizations as exercising considerable influence over their 
targets‟ responses (e.g., Lounsbury 2001; Raeburn 2004; Reid and Toffel, 2009).  For example, 
Weber, Rao, and Thomas (2009) found that movement activists successfully penetrated German 
pharmaceutical firms to persuade them to cease manufacturing and distributing biotechnology 
products.  Raeburn (2004) studied the likelihood that the corporations comprising the Fortune 
1000 would extend their marriage benefits to domestic partners when pressured by LGBT 
activist organizations.  Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett (2000) suggest that numerous firms have 
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adopted voluntary emissions controls in response to advocacy from the environmental 
movement.   
 
But, in limiting its focus to mechanisms of direct influence and the incidence of direct 
concession to activist demands, this research stream has adopted a relatively narrow view of the 
impact of social movements.  We know that firms often voluntarily engage in social actions that 
are substantively unrelated to movement demands. Yet, it is possible that even these social 
actions may be instigated by movement pressures, as for example, when Walmart makes 
community donations in the wake of protests against recent store openings (Ingram, Yue, and 
Rao 2010). We continue to lack a clear, empirically-supported theory that explains the link 
between social movement activity and more general increases in social action among 
organizational targets.    
 
In this paper, we draw on impression management theory to proffer and test a dynamic, 
mechanisms-oriented theory of the link between social movement pressure and increased 
corporate social activity (e.g., Goffman, 1959; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Whetten and Mackey, 
2002).  Our ultimate goals are threefold: 1) to empirically test whether targeted organizations 
respond to social movement activism by increasing the frequency of visible social actions, 2) to 
proffer a theory of why this response occurs and the mechanisms by which it is moderated, and 
3) to test the efficacy of increased social actions in ameliorating the threat of social movement 
activism.  We suggest that the primary mechanism of influence wielded by mobilized 
movements is their ability to provoke an image threat in their organizational targets.  An image 
threat occurs when an organization‟s audiences or reference publics are given reason to doubt its 
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audience-specific commitments and expectations.  The experience of an image threat encourages 
targets to be more heedful of the expectations of their external audiences.   Targeted 
organizations may react to quell a movement-induced image threat by engaging in impression 
management, promulgating images that confirm their association with positively-valenced, 
identity-confirming activities that promote and protect favorable audience perceptions.   
 
The use of corporate social actions to appease focal audiences is supported in research.  For 
examples, Gray et al. (1995) suggest that disclosure of socially beneficial activities is one routine 
element of organizations‟ ongoing effort to enlist and retain the support of their primary 
audiences.  Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen (2009) argue that social actions can effectively 
promote goodwill from target audiences when organizations are facing a negative event, such as 
legal or regulatory trouble.  In line with this past research, we suggest that increased social 
actions communicated in the face of an image threat represents an organization‟s efforts to 
manage the perceptions held by its internal and external audiences – namely, its identity and 
reputation – by diluting the salience of the discrepant information promulgated by the movement 
activists, providing identity-confirming information to reduce identity/image incongruence, and 
issuing confirming information to protect the organization‟s reputation among target audiences 
and opinion leaders.  Thus, post-threat increases in social action operate as positively-
distinguishing image claims that buffer an organization‟s image by diluting, rather than 
necessarily refuting, the negatively-distinguishing claims waged by activists.   
 
In addition to proffering the image threat as a primary mechanism linking social movement 
activism to increased frequency of social actions, we also seek to theoretically account for 
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variance in organizations‟ responses to external activism.  Specifically, we argue that the extent 
to which an image threat will provoke increased social action is moderated at both the social- and 
firm-level.  First, at the social level, an organization‟s response to an external attack depends on 
its current social situation, namely, i) its reputation, or the way that the organization is perceived 
by its target audience, and ii) the extent to which the organization‟s reputation is founded on 
previous communications that social actions are integral to the firm‟s identity.    Second, at the 
firm-level, the likelihood that an organization will attend to and act to ameliorate an image threat 
depends on the perceived viability of the activists‟ threat, namely i) the salience of the threat 
posed by the movement‟s activities, and ii) the perceived vulnerability of the organization‟s 
reputation. 
 
The final goal of this paper is to determine whether increases in social action are an effective 
means to quell an extra-institutional image attack.  Because we are arguing that intensifying 
social actions reduces the salience of threatening images and helps to maintain the support of an 
organization‟s focal audiences, we expect post-attack increases in social actions to be associated 
with a lower incidence of long term reputational damage for the organizational targets of social 
movement attacks. 
 
We empirically test our theoretical predictions using a sample of consumer boycotts.  Boycotts 
are a coercive social movement tactic, favored by upwardly mobile members of marginalized 
groups (Gardberg and Newburry 2010), that are employed in an effort to compel a targeted 
organization to change offensive behavior.  Though boycotts ostensibly operate to disrupt an 
organization‟s material performance by slowing demand for its products or services, recent 
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scholarship questions whether many boycotts are effective in constraining their targets‟ resources 
in this way (Vogel 2005; King 2008). Consumers are slow to change their behavior even when 
they support a boycott‟s ideals (Miller and Sturdivant 1977).  In a recent paper, King (2008) 
postulated that the “most critical mechanism” shaping a boycott‟s influence is boycotters‟ ability 
to threaten their target‟s public image and harm its reputation: to provoke an image threat.  To 
assess our theoretical propositions regarding the link between social movement activity and 
targets‟ social action disclosures, we examine the change in the number of socially-oriented 
activities that firms disclose via press releases in the six months after an announcement that the 
firm is being boycotted.  Following the preponderance of literature in this area, corporate social 
actions are here defined to include all voluntary corporate actions extending beyond the mere 
transactional interests of the firm that are designed to provide social benefits or address the social 
problems of a firm‟s external constituencies (e.g., Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi 
2007; Davis 1973; Waddock 2004; Mackey, Mackey and Barney 2007; Wood 1991a,b; Wood 
and Jones 1995).   
 
Our chosen context is ripe for an in-depth inquiry into generalized social action responses to 
boycotts.  Both boycotters and targeted firms rely on media outlets that allow them to capture the 
attention of and potentially persuade a wide array of audiences or reference publics (Lipsky, 
1968).  Given boycotters‟ implicit reliance on the media, the press release is an especially 
appropriate venue for firms wishing to combat any unfavorable information boycotters are 
issuing.  Press releases can be posted in the same outlets that broadcast the activities of 
movement activists, allowing a company to communicate with the very same reference publics 
whose support the movement activists hope to enlist.  Also, press releases can be issued on the 
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fly, providing companies with a quick and flexible means to combat the boycotters‟ threat.  
These characteristics make the press release a more suitable venue for ameliorating the threat of 
a boycott than other popular social action disclosure venues, such as annual reports or corporate 
websites (e.g., Holder-Webb et al. 2009).  Finally, press releases allow an organization to 
actively communicate messages that defend its image from activists‟ vilifying accusations 
without incidentally legitimizing the movement by publicly recognizing the boycott‟s existence 
or directly addressing the activists‟ claims.  
 
We offer several theoretical contributions to organizational theory and the study of social 
movements.  First, by developing a more dynamic model of the link between external activism 
and internal corporate social activity, we answer the call from management researchers for more 
research on corporate social activity that extends beyond the search for its relationship to 
economic performance (e.g., Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003).  By focusing on the role played 
by the image threat in mediating boycotts‟ indirect effects on targets‟ general levels of social 
action, we contribute to an elucidation of the image threat as a mechanism undergirding social 
movements‟ tactical influence, contributing to the search for mechanisms-oriented accounts of 
movement phenomena (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).  Further, we show that firms‟ 
proclivity to engage in impression management – akin to an individual‟s presentation of self 
(Goffman 1959) - explains variation in firm responses to movement-induced image threats.  
Thus, our theory supplements work on impression management and “stigma management” (e.g., 
Elsbach and Kramer, 1996; Rivera, 2008) by casting corporate social actions as one mechanism 
employed by firms working to actively resolve threats to their image and identity.   
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Finally, our study answers the call for more research on the consequences of social movement 
activity (Giugni 1998; Soule et al. 1999; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1999; Earl 2000).  Whereas 
outcome-oriented social movement research has focused predominantly on targets‟ direct 
responses to a movement‟s demands (e.g., Rojas 2006; Bartley 2007; King 2008; Weber, Rao 
and Thomas 2009), our study delves into the less explored terrain of movements‟ potential 
indirect and unintended consequences (Deng, 1997; Cress and Snow, 2000).  Scholars studying 
the impact of movements on markets have found that movements often have diffuse, 
unanticipated consequences for the emergence of new institutional logics (Haveman, Rao, and 
Paruchuri 2007) or the mobilization of resources and identities that cultivate the formation of 
new markets and industries (Sine and Lee 2009; Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert 2009).  We contribute to 
this body of research by extending what has generally been understood as the response repertoire 
of targeted organizations to include a general increase in firms‟ “virtuous” behaviors (Vogel 
2005).  Our research ultimately suggests that activism may lead to increases in socially-
advantageous action within the marketplace even when activists are not successful in eliciting a 
direct policy response to their own valued issue. 
 
Corporate Social Action as an Impression Management Tool  
 
Theories about the organization‟s relationship to its broader institutional environment help us 
understand why an organization might respond to extra-institutional activism by taking 
additional social action.  Organizations operate within a superordinate social system or 
institutional environment that shapes their internal commitments and core character and identity 
traits (e.g., Selznick 1957; Parsons 1960; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Whetten 2006).  As actors 
within a larger social or institutional system, organizations rely on the approval of relevant 
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others, or “target audiences,” in order to obtain needed resources and survive (Meyer and Rowan 
1977; Oliver 1991; 1997).   The relevant audience is made up of both primary stakeholders 
(including the employees, shareholders and other internal actors who are directly affiliated with 
the firm) and secondary stakeholders (including regulators, media, and other opinion makers who 
can indirectly influence the firm‟s success) (Clarkson 1995).  
 
As organizations engage with their particular audiences, they make commitments that 
synchronously inform the expectations of their audiences and contribute to the formation of a 
unique organizational identity or character (Selznick 1957; Love and Kraatz 2009; King, Felin, 
and Whetten 2010). Because each organization relies on the support of target audiences to 
survive, it must heedfully cultivate a favorable conception of itself to promote among key 
stakeholders.  This conception becomes the firm‟s identity.  We follow Whetten and Mackey‟s 
(2002) characterization of the organizational identity as “a set of categorical identity claims… in 
reference to a specified set of institutionally standardized social categories.”  At the population 
or field level, identity claims are nested within a larger categorical system of identity choices that 
affiliate organizations with particular organizational forms, audiences, and expectations (Hsu and 
Hannan 2005; Hannan, Polos, and Carroll 2007). At the firm-level, claims might arise and evolve 
organically or be purposefully cultivated, but they create the internal component of every 
organization‟s self-management project and sustain an ongoing conversation with the focal 
audiences who share the social space in which the organization is embedded.   
 
Previous research on organizational identity suggests that much of its value derives from its 
usefulness as a source of differentiation (Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail 1994).  An emphasis on 
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the uniqueness of organizational identity is apparent in Selznick‟s (1957: pg. 139) 
characterization of an organization‟s identity as an enduring “special character” that arises as the 
characteristics or activities of an organization became infused with value over time.  Scott 
(1995), too, suggests that an organization‟s character or identity represents “a distinctive set of 
values” endorsed by the organization.  Importantly, this suggests that organizations cannot all 
claim or identify with the same values. Attempts to make far-reaching claims that depart from 
one‟s core identity may even lead to audience sanctions and cause the organization to be 
devalued relative to its peers (Zuckerman 1999; Hsu 2006; Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak 2009). 
 
An organization‟s image represents its efforts to communicate its identity claims to its audiences.  
This communication is motivated by the intent of organizational insiders to shape the external 
audiences‟ conception of the organization‟s core beliefs, values, and role in the social framework 
(Bernstein 1984).  Again, our definition is consistent with that proffered by Whetten and Mackey 
(2002), who describe organizational image as “what organizational agents want their external 
stakeholders to understand is most central, enduring, and distinctive about their organization.”   
 
Although a company could theoretically emanate whatever identity claims it pleased, firms that 
hope to succeed must maintain a viable image of conformity and commitment to socially 
acceptable – or legitimate – behaviors, norms and values (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott, Ruef, 
Mendel and Caronna 2000; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Dacin 1997; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; 
King and Whetten 2008).  Corporate social action represents one category of such socially 
calibrated identity claims.  These initiatives span a wide array of socially supported topics 
including, for example, charitable disaster relief, environmental protection programs, promotion 
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of education, initiatives furthering social justice and diversity, and support of the arts.  When 
firms disseminate images of themselves participating in social actions, they are conveying 
evidence to their audience that furtherance of the social good is a part of their corporate identity, 
implying that the symbiotic role they play with society merits the audience‟s support.    This 
aspect of corporate social action has prompted writers in business ethics to herald corporate 
social disclosures as a sort of institutional panacea for image management, allowing 
organizations “to emphasize what [they are] doing „well‟ while downplaying what [they are] 
not.”  (Holder-Webb et al. 2009: pg. 501).    
 
Evidence from Useem‟s (1984) interviews with high-powered members of the “inner circle” 
supports the proposition that social action disclosures are used to strategically construct a 
coalition of supportive target audiences.  In one particularly telling example, a chief executive 
from a large U.S. manufacturing company claimed that arts sponsorship provided incremental 
benefits, as “over time you get a larger and larger audience that has a better opinion of you”  
(1984: 120).  Useem‟s interviews also highlight the deliberateness with which corporations 
employ social actions to cultivate and manipulate a company‟s image among key audience 
members.  In one interview, for example, a spokesperson at IBM stated that the company 
supported operas, ballets, and schools to “make[] sure that its corporate image is associated with 
something both creative and culturally laudable.” (120).  An Exxon representative, too, cited 
evidence from surveys to suggest that the company‟s support of cultural programs “improves 
[our] image among those who count” (120).   
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One consequence of organizations‟ active image cultivation is that an organization‟s image can 
be threatened if image-discrepant information becomes available to its audiences.  Such 
discrepant information might leak from within a firm, be disclosed by a regulator or monitor, 
disseminated by a rival, or proffered by social movement activists (King and Soule 2007; 
Rindova and Fombrun 1999; Price, Gioia and Corley 2008; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Hsu and 
Hannan 2005; Whetten and Mackey 2002). Discrepant information disrupts an organization‟s 
effective impression management, as audience members and internal actors receiving discrepant 
information may come to doubt the firm‟s expressed image or espoused identity. For example, 
while Chemical Bank disseminated images of itself in 1990 touting its participation in a low-
income housing program, movement activists in the town of Yonkers demanded a boycott of the 
bank‟s services, publishing blatantly image-discrepant information claiming that the bank‟s 
official policies unfairly discriminated against low-income mortgage applicants.   
 
Aside from evoking dissonance surrounding an organization‟s image, doubt introduced among 
organizational audiences may threaten the organization‟s reputation, a valuable intangible asset 
based on stakeholders‟ evaluative feedback “concerning the credibility of the organization‟s 
identity claims” (Whetten and Mackey 2002; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Fombrun, 1996; 
Weigelt and Camerer 1988).  In times when a firm‟s image is threatened, therefore, it is likely 
that organizations will respond to defend their image and protect their reputation by increasing 
the amount of positive identity claims they communicate to audiences.  As we have argued that 
corporations use social actions as a routine tool in building audience support, we predict that 
firms facing an extra-institutional image threat will disclose more social actions as a defensive 
impression management tool.  Therefore:  
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Hypothesis 1: Firms that are boycotted will increase the amount of social actions 
disclosed in press releases in the six months following the announcement of the boycott. 
 
Explaining firm-level variance in the use of corporate social actions  
 
In light of the identity heterogeneity of organizations, we do not expect that responses to image 
threats will be uniform across organizations.  Firms have unique sets of focal audiences, not all 
of which will expect a firm to respond to image threats in this way. Rather, the extent of a single 
firm‟s use of social actions in response to a threat depends on a combination of both social- and 
firm-level factors.    
 
Corporate social action disclosures are examples of deliberately disseminated images that 
organizations use in attempting to communicate their unique identities to target audiences. 
Images are inherently affected by each organization‟s conception of itself – its identity – and the 
evaluative feedback it receives from audiences – its reputation.  Therefore, differences in 
organizations‟ established identities and reputations may explain why some firms draw upon 
images of social actions to mitigate image threats.   
 
Firm Identity and Image Repertoires 
 
Organizations use images to communicate identity claims and amass support from target 
audiences.  These images synchronously serve as a means of organizational expression and 
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restraint.  This is because identity claims function as both communications and commitments 
(Selznick 1957; Whetten 2006): any audience support garnered by using images that portray the 
organization as behaving in a certain way creates a future expectation that the company will 
continue to act in that same way.    
 
Moreover, research on organizational identity has stressed the importance of identity stability, 
suggesting that inharmonious images can provoke harmful internal dissonance (Dutton, Dukerich 
and Harquail 1994; Gioia, Schultz, and Corley 2000).  Dutton and Dukerich (1991: 520), for 
example, argue that “each individual‟s sense of self is tied in part to [the organization‟s] image,” 
suggesting that image threats may be interpreted by individual actors within organizations as 
affronts to their own personal identity.  Recent evidence suggests that this may be especially true 
for organizations that have cultivated an impression among audiences of their identification with 
social issues because these may be especially valued by internal actors.  For example, Carmeli, 
Gilat and Waldmen (2007) find that the perceived social responsibility of an organization is 
positively associated with organizational identification among employees.  Further, a survey 
conducted by Stanford Graduate School of Business found that top MBA students place 
significant weight on the social actions of potential employers; they reported being willing to 
accept a lower salary job in return for placement with a company that outperforms others in this 
dimension (Montgomery and Ramus 2008).  
 
In communicating their identities to external audiences, we argue that organizations craft distinct 
image repertoires (Clemens 1997).  An image repertoire, in its entirety, represents a complete set 
of the identity claims that an organization has made to its audiences. When managing image 
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threats, organizations are likely to respond in predictable ways, drawing from this assembled 
repertoire of identity claims to confirm the impressions and reinforce commitments previously 
fostered among both internal and external audiences. Organizations actively working to quell an 
image threat should disseminate information that supports past identity claims. These 
communications dilute the salience of the image threat and reduce whatever uncertainty the 
threat has provoked among target audiences who are concerned with the veracity of the 
organization‟s previous identity claims.   
 
In the modern marketplace, many companies have already made earnest efforts to build a 
positive reputation by incorporating social responsibility initiatives into their business operations 
(Scherer and Palazzo 2007) or participating in other philanthropic activities (Useem 1984).   
While social actions are already a part of most companies‟ image repertoires, it remains 
predominately discretionary.  In fact, it is the voluntary nature of social actions that make them 
especially valuable impression management tools. If organizations have made social actions 
integral to their identity when communicating with target audiences in the past, they are likely to 
continue using social action when responding to an image threat.  Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The amount of social action disclosed before a boycott (base corporate 
social action before a threat occurs) will be positively associated with the change in the 
number of social action disclosures after a boycott. 
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Firm Reputation 
Organizations vary in the extent to which they are successful in convincing their target audiences 
of the veracity of the identity claims that they make.  Reputation reflects a type of collective 
feedback from the organization‟s constituent audiences relaying the current credibility of the 
organization‟s images (Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Whetten and Mackey 2002). In this way, 
reputation can be thought of as a measure of the success of organizational attempts to manage 
audience perceptions.   
 
Companies that have maintained strong reputations over time enjoy relative stability in their 
audiences‟ perceptions. Audiences of these organizations develop higher levels of confidence in 
the veracity of the organization‟s image and are more likely to give the organization‟s claims the 
benefit of the doubt when presented with discrepant information (Coombs and Halladay 2006).   
This is supported by research on the „halo effect,‟ which suggests that organizations with stable, 
high reputations tend to be more resilient in the face of crisis and less vulnerable to 
environmental threats (Bromley 1993; Fombrun 1996; Sine, Shane and Di Gregorio 2003).   
Positive reputations make organizations more resilient in the face of crisis, so that they are less 
likely to perceive the threat as posing a credible risk to their cultivated image.  Therefore, 
organizations with positive reputations will have less need to actively engage in impression 
management following a boycott:   
 
Hypothesis 3: A company‟s reputation before a boycott will be will be negatively 
associated with the change in the number of social actions disclosed after a boycott 
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However, if audiences perceive that a firm is reputable because its previous commitments to 
social action, the firm may be even more committed to this path of socially responsible action 
when faced with an image threat.  In cases like this, the firm‟s reputation may be founded on past 
commitments that lead audiences to expect future social action.
1
 The image threat causes a direct 
contradiction between the discrepant information offered by the activists and the widely-held 
perception of the organization‟s identity.  This may trigger the firm to attempt to resolve that 
contradiction by emphasizing and magnifying positively-differentiating images used in the past 
(i.e., more social action). Ultimately, therefore, reputable firms are the most shameable if they 
have built their reputation using images that are directly impugned by the discrepant information 
presented by activists.  Further, viewing reputations as a valuable intangible asset, organizations 
with high reputations have more to lose as the result of the image threat, which ought to make 
them more likely to take action to counteract the threat with identity-consistent behavior.  Taken 
together, these considerations suggest that individual organizational responses to image threats 
are the result of a fundamental interaction between the identity claims the organization has made 
in the past and its reputation.  Specifically, organizations that have high reputations and have 
built those reputations partly through social actions should be most likely to respond to an image 
threat by doing additional social actions: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The number of social action disclosures before a boycott will positively 
moderate the effect of reputation on the change in the number of social actions disclosed 
after a boycott. 
 
                                                          
1
 Research has shown that social movements are more likely to target reputable firms because these are the leaders 
of their fields and the most likely to be emulated by others (Strang & Soule, 1998; McAdam & Scott, 2005; Rao, 
Morill & Zald, 2000; Rojas, 2006; Bartley and Child, working paper). 
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The promulgation of press releases to quell an image threat requires action at the organizational 
level.  However, just as individuals, organizations have limited abilities to attend to and act on 
the multitude of information and issues available to them (Simon 1947). In order for an 
organization to function it must be selective in where and how it directs its attention.  
Organizational responses to image threats, therefore, depend on the level of organizational 
attention that the threat attracts (Ocasio 1997; King, 2008).    
 
Action at the organizational level depends in part on the focus of individual actors within the 
organization and the characteristics of the situation in which the focused attention occurs (Ocasio 
1997).  While a firm may be aware of an image threat, its external audiences may not be paying 
attention and therefore the attempted attack should not appear very threatening. Regardless of 
whether a threatened organization would choose in the abstract to defend its image, an 
organization‟s actual response to a social movement threat depends on i) whether the threat 
captures the focus of the target organization, ii) whether the organization‟s audiences are aware 
of the threat, and iii) whether the organization‟s situation influences actors to recognize the 
discrepant information as a viable threat to its image.   
 
We propose that salient images are more likely to capture the focus of organizational actors, but 
that organizational members are unlikely to elicit an organization to actively counteract image 
threats unless they perceive the organization‟s public image as vulnerable. 
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Salience of Discrepant Information  
Not all boycotts will generate equal responses from the target organizations. Indeed, a poorly 
orchestrated boycott might pass without organizational actors or their audiences having ever 
been aware of it at all.  The greater the salience of the discrepant information disseminated by the 
boycotters, however, the greater likelihood that the targeted organization will attend to the image 
threat and take action to counter it.  Accordingly, we expect that organizations are more likely to 
act against an image threat when it receives more public attention, thereby making the threat 
more salient in the minds of organizational decision-makers (Hoffman and Ocasio 2001; King 
2008).   
 
Media attention, in particular, may afford a viable external avenue to organizational attention.  
Media attention both increases the salience of the image threat and implicitly legitimates that 
threat by recognizing it as worthy of public interest (Koopmans and Olzak 2004).  A social 
movement‟s tactical threat is largely mediated by its ability to use the media to broadcast 
grievances to a broad audience, thereby shaping public opinion and changing social norms and 
drawing those audiences into a public fight (Lipsky 1968; Oberschall 1973; Walgrave and 
Manssens 2000).  King (2008), for example, demonstrated that boycotts are more successful in 
garnering concessions from their targets when they receive more media attention. Thus, the 
ancillary effects of media attention should increase the apparent importance of the discrepant 
image and make organizational actors more likely to focus their attention on it.  Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The amount of media attention received by a boycott will be positively 
associated with the change in the number of social actions disclosed after a boycott. 
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Recent Changes in Reputation  
Reputations, being collective assessments of a firm‟s attempts to manage audiences‟ perceptions, 
ought to be relatively stable unless significant new images or information are made available to 
organizational audiences.  A recent change in reputation increases the likelihood that the 
organization is attending to its public image and perceptions among audiences. For example, if 
reputations have recently increased, this suggests that an organization is actively attending to the 
expectations of its audience, disseminating images or publicly acting in ways that cultivate a 
more favorable conception of its identity.  Further, organizations with recently improved 
reputations are unlikely to take their reputations for granted, instead wanting to protect and 
maintain this newly won intangible resource.  On the other hand, firms with recently damaged 
reputations are especially sensitive to the demands placed on them by stakeholder activists.  
 
An organization that is actively attending to its reputation is more presently heedful of its 
impression among target audiences.  If an image threat occurs in this situational context, it is 
more likely that the organization will notice and will take action to neutralize the threat.  But, 
organizations have options in how to ameliorate a social movement threat.  King (2008) found 
that companies that have experienced reputation declines immediately prior to a boycott are 
more likely to respond by conceding. These organizations may be more cognizant of their 
audience‟s growing inclination to distrust or disapprove of them and, therefore, inclined to work 
with activists to neutralize the image threat in the quickest way possible.   Having suffered a 
recent demoralizing loss in reputational capital, they may also simply lack the resources or 
motivation needed to wage an expensive social campaign to defend their past identity claims.   
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In contrast, companies that have recently experienced a significant gain in their organization‟s 
reputation are less likely to concede to activists. Because of concession‟s implicit recognition of 
the veracity of the activists‟ claims and to protect their newly acquired legitimacy, organizations 
that have recently experienced a reputational gain might instead be motivated to engage in 
impression management and deflect the public‟s attention to the activists‟ disparaging claims by 
offering confirming evidence that they deserve their current high reputations. Experiencing a 
reputational gain may embolden a firm to accentuate the positive aspects of its image in the face 
of an image threat. 
Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Recent increases in reputation before a boycott should be positively 
associated with the change in the number of social actions disclosed after a boycott. 
 
However, an organization‟s response to an image threat depends on both the salience of the 
threat and the situational context in which the threat occurs.  Therefore, media attention may 
increase the likelihood of receiving the organizational actors‟ focus, but the response will be 
even more intense when paired with the situational element of having experienced recent 
reputational changes.  High levels of media attention to a boycott might amplify the image threat 
and get the attention of organizational actors, but an organization is most likely to actively 
respond disclosing more social action if it is already attending to its reputation and inclined to 
protect its recent reputational gains: 
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Hypothesis 7: The interaction of the change in reputation before a boycott and the media 
attention received by a boycott will be significantly positively associated with the change 
in the number of social actions disclosed after a boycott. 
 
 
The Efficacy of Social Actions to Quell an Image Attack 
 
An image attack presents discrepant images that may cause key audiences to question an 
organization‟s claimed conformity to institutionally endorsed norms and values.  Thus, a 
particularly effective image threat may ultimately jeopardize an organization‟s reputation, or the 
extent to which audience members perceive the organization as a socially valuable and 
normatively appropriate entity. 
 
 We have argued throughout this paper that social actions may be used as an impression 
management tool by firms facing an activist-induced image threat.  Corporate social actions offer 
firms a means to promulgate positively-valenced images that encourage audience support by 
confirming the organization‟s identity as socially oriented and institutionally appropriate.   Thus, 
firms that react to an image threat by disclosing additional social actions should have a higher 
likelihood of perpetuating a positive perception among their target audiences.   As a result, these 
firms should be less likely to suffer reputational damage as a result of the image threat.  It 
follows that: 
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Hypothesis 8: Boycotted firms that increase their social actions should be less likely to 
suffer reputational declines in the years following the boycott. 
  
Methods 
 
Data and Dependent Variable 
To assess how boycotts affect the changes in the number of corporate social action disclosures, 
we collected information on all of the United States-based boycotts targeting publicly-traded 
companies that were covered by top national newspapers from 1990 to 2005. Following a strong 
tradition in social movement scholarship of using newspaper data to identify major movement 
events (e.g., McAdam and Su 2002; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Earl et al. 2004; Van 
Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004), coders gathered data on boycott reports from five national 
newspapers:  the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, and 
Los Angeles Times. Using these five national newspapers limited the potential for regional bias.
2
 
Research assistants searched the newspapers during the corresponding time period for the word 
“boycott” in the article‟s text using the Factiva, Proquest, and Lexis-Nexis databases. They then 
matched the boycott reports with company-specific data from COMPUSTAT (includes all 
financial controls). In total, the dataset includes 133 distinct boycotts involving 189 target 
companies.  Because financial data were not available for some of these target firms, the 
regression below only reports 165 observations of boycotted firms. 
 
                                                          
2
 One potential problem with gathering data from newspaper reports is that the dataset censors out boycotts that were 
not salient enough to warrant national media coverage. While ideally we would include all boycott events, we are 
comfortable with our results knowing that any media attention effect we find would be a conservative estimate.  
Keeping up Appearances 24 
 
To operationalize the dependent variable – a measure of changes in target firms‟ corporate social 
responsibility initiatives after the boycott is announced – we gathered additional information on 
the number of times each target company announced its involvement in a corporate social 
activity in the six months before and the six months after a boycott‟s announcement.  To find the 
initiatives, we used the online database Factiva and searched PR Newswire and Business Wire 
for all social action-related press releases issued by each boycotted company.  Identified 
initiatives span a wide array of topics including, for example, social justice and diversity 
initiatives, disaster relief, environmental protection programs, promotion of education, and 
support of the arts.  We do not include items that were not sent out directly by the company or 
items that announce that the company has been given an award for its socially beneficial 
activities because the company itself did not necessarily control the timing of these types of 
releases. Thus, the resulting dataset of corporate social actions reflects only initiatives that were 
clearly and calculatedly sent out to the public by the target firm.  Our search yielded a total of 
1,302 distinct social action initiatives promulgated by targeted firms in the year surrounding the 
announcement of a boycott.  The dependent variable – the change in corporate social 
responsibility after the boycott‟s announcement – was calculated by subtracting the number of 
initiatives in the six months before the boycott from the number in the six months after the 
boycott.  This change variable ranged from -13 to 16 with a mean of 1.01.   
 
In order to test hypothesis 1 - that firms are more likely to disclose social action initiatives after 
boycott events - we gathered additional data on corporate social action among a set of matched 
firms from a comparable group of publicly-traded firms. Given that firm size is a good predictor 
of whether a firm is boycotted (King, 2008), we randomly matched three firms from a sample of 
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the five-hundred largest publicly-traded firms (by asset value) with the boycott targets. This 
resulted in a total set of 508 matched firms.  We then compared the difference in corporate social 
action disclosures in the six months before and after the boycott event date for both the targeted 
firm and its three randomly matched firms.  The complete set of matched firms was also included 
in the first stage of a Heckman regression model that allowed us to account for potential 
selection bias in our sample of firms targeted by boycotts. 
 
Independent Variables 
To test hypotheses 2, we included a measure of the company‟s base level of corporate social 
activity (base CSA), which is a count of the number of social action press disclosures released by 
a company in the six months prior to the announcement of a boycott.  In order to normalize the 
distribution of this variable – which was naturally skewed to the right – we transformed it in the 
regression model by taking its square root.  To assess hypothesis 3, we coded each firm‟s 
reputation in the year prior the boycott using Fortune magazine‟s list of the “Top 100 Most 
Admired Companies” in the United States.  This list is regularly employed in organizational 
scholarship as a reliable indicator of a company‟s overall reputation (McGuire, Sundgren, and 
Schneeweis 1988; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Staw and Epstein 2000; Roberts and Dowling 
2002; King 2008).  These data serve as a proxy for overall audience assessments, being founded, 
in part, on surveys capturing the perceptions of executives of peer firms.  The variable used in 
the model represents an ordinal transformation of the raw reputation scores.  Companies not 
included in Fortune‟s ranking received a value of “0.”  A score of “1” was given to companies 
receiving a raw reputation score ranging from 1 to 5; companies with raw scores between 5.1 and 
7.99 received a score of “2.”  The highest value, “3,” includes all companies that received a 
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reputation score higher than an 8.  The grouping of the scores roughly corresponds to the 
quartiles of raw reputation score among firms in our sample. Hypothesis 4 is tested by the 
inclusion of an interaction variable of the product of the base number of social action disclosures 
and reputation variables.  Hypothesis 8 is tested using a binary variable – reputation damage – 
that was coded “1” if a firm‟s Fortune reputation score decreased in the two years after the year 
it was boycotted, and “0” otherwise. 
 
To test hypothesis 5, we include an independent variable -- level of media attention – that reflects 
a count of the number of newspaper articles that discuss a boycott in the six-month period 
following the announcement of a boycott.  The newspapers searched for articles concerning the 
boycotts include The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, 
and Los Angeles Times.  We exclude all articles that deal with the initial announcement of the 
boycott and those dealing with a boycott concession. To evaluate hypothesis 6 we include a 
measure of reputation change. This variable was derived from the reputation score used to test 
hypothesis 3.  This variable indicates the difference in a company‟s reputation two years prior to 
the boycott and its reputation in the year of the boycott.  Higher scores reflect positive changes in 
reputation.  Because Fortune‟s admiration rankings are computed using a survey conducted in 
the year prior to the index‟s publishing year, this variable reflects a one-year lag and does not 
result from the actual boycott.  To test hypothesis 7 we include an interaction variable of the 
product of the media attention and reputation change score. 
 
 
 
Keeping up Appearances 27 
 
Control Variables 
We include a number of control variables to account for variance explained by firm-level 
characteristics and situational features of the boycott.  To control for a firm‟s general level of PR 
activity, we include a variable capturing the total number of non-social action related PR releases 
(Total Other PR) of each firm in the six months prior to a boycott.  To correct for the skew in 
this variable, we took its square root.  As a proxy for each firm‟s size, we control for the logged 
number of employees.  We also control for each firm‟s market to book ratio as a general proxy 
for financial strength. 
 
Given Waddock and Graves‟ (1997) popular business case for corporate social responsibility 
suggesting that the level of social action a company will engage in is mediated by the level of 
slack resources held by a company at any one time, we included a control for the firm‟s free cash 
flow which approximates the amount of the company‟s excess resources.  This variable, 
collected using Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database, is calculated as the firm‟s 
depreciation value added to its operating income and divided by its total number of common 
shares.  The use of a firm‟s cash flow operationalized in this way as a general indicator of slack 
is common in business literature (Davis and Stout 1992; King 2008; King and Soule 2007).   
 
Because a target firm‟s industry may affect its general propensity to engage in corporate social 
responsibility initiatives (e.g., Chen and Bouvain 2009; Delmas and Toffel 2004; Marshall 
Cordano and Silverman 2005), we included dummy variables for a number of industries: 
Technology, Financial, Media and Health. We also included a dummy variable that reflects 
whether the target of a boycott was a subsidiary of a company instead of the mother company.  
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Such boycotts might be expected to be gauged as less threatening to the parent company than a 
boycott waged against the parent company itself.  Finally, we included dummy variables to 
control for common issues raised in the boycotts, including boycotts raising animal rights issues, 
safety issues, environmental concerns, labor issues, religiously-motivated issues, or claims of 
gender discrimination.
3
  Descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables are 
included in Table 1, below. 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
Regression Model 
In the regression models testing hypotheses 2-7, our dependent variable, change in the number of 
corporate social action disclosures, is normally distributed.  Although the count variable from 
which it was created has a Poisson distribution, the difference between the number of initiatives 
does not have the same skewed distribution and is not truncated at zero. We therefore use a form 
of linear regression to estimate our results.  
 
In order to account for the potential endogeneity of social action and the likelihood of being 
boycotted, we use a Heckman selection analysis in which the first stage model is a probit 
regression of the likelihood of being boycotted and the second stage model is an OLS regression 
of the change in the number of social action initiatives. The final stage includes a Heckman 
selection coefficient in the model to control for the probability that a company would be 
boycotted in the first place. We included the Fortune 500 matched sample in the first stage probit 
analysis. Following King (2008), we included two exogenous variables, the number of times that 
a firm was boycotted in the previous five years and the number of times that a firm‟s industry 
                                                          
3
 We included other issue dummies in models not shown but they did not improve the fit of the model. 
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was boycotted in the previous five years, in the first stage analysis. Neither variable was 
correlated with the dependent variable in the second stage of the analysis, but were highly 
predictive of whether a firm became a boycott target. In this first stage of the regression, we also 
controlled for the total assets of each company, the square root of its base social action in the 
prior six months, and the square root of its total non-corporate social action PR activity in the 
prior six months.  
 
To test hypothesis 8, we employ a probit regression of all independent and control variables on 
the likelihood of suffering a decline in reputation in the two years after being targeted by 
boycotters. 
 
Results 
To test hypothesis 1, we first employed a paired t-test to examine whether our sample of 
boycotted firms significantly increased the number of social action disclosures in response to the 
announcement of a boycott.  Among the 168 firms in our sample, the mean number of social 
action press releases in the six months before a boycott‟s announcement was 3.30 and the mean 
number of social action releases in the six months after was 4.31.  This difference was significant 
at the .001 level.  To make sure that these differences were due to the boycott itself rather than to 
exogenous factors accounting for general increases in social action across all firms during a 
certain time period, we next employed an unpaired t-test comparing the change in social action 
disclosures of boycotted firms with that of the randomly matched non-target firms.   Boycotted 
firms averaged an increase of 1.01 releases in the six months after a boycott‟s announcement, 
whereas the randomly matched firms averaged an increase of only 0.17 disclosures.  This 
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difference was significant at the .001 level.  This t-test confirms that the increase in disclosures 
was associated with a boycott event and was not caused by exogenous factors. Together, these 
two t-tests provide support for hypothesis 1 – that firms respond to boycotts by increasing their 
communicated corporate social action.  
 
In addition to comparing the quantity of social action disclosures, we also engaged in a manual 
content analysis to code for various dimensions of the disclosures‟ qualities.  We then compared 
the disclosures of boycotted companies before and after the boycott‟s announcement.  
Comparing the before and after number of disclosures on a number of dimensions, we found no 
significant differences in their length, the likelihood of donating money, the amount of donated 
money, or the likelihood of partnering with other organizations.  We expect that the apparent 
stability in the qualities of corporate social action disclosures is largely due to the routinization 
of the task of preparing press releases within the specialized public relations wing of most large 
companies.  Thus, the utilization of social actions to palliate an image threat seems to rest 
primarily on the quantity of disclosures, rather than their content.   
 
Table 2 shows the results of the first-stage probit model.  The first-stage results replicate King‟s 
(2008) findings that activists are more likely to target firms that have been boycotted in the past 
five years or that belong to industries that have been frequently targeted by boycotts in the past 
five years.    Contrary to King (2008), we find that firm size is negatively associated with the 
likelihood that it will be boycotted when controlling for the past number of social action 
disclosures. This contradictory finding suggests that the effect of firm size on the likelihood of 
being boycotted is mediated by a firm‟s level of social activity. Activists appear to target firms 
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that are actively cultivating an image of social responsibility.  Activists may choose to target 
such companies because this image can be easily contradicted with discrepant information, 
affording a proximate opportunity to damage the company‟s relationship with its audiences and 
create an image crisis. This finding also runs contrary to Baron‟s (2001) proposition that social 
action should buffer an organization from being targeted by extra-institutional attacks. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 
The regression results of the models testing hypotheses 2 – 7 are reported in Table 3 below. 
Model 1 shows the main effects of our independent variables. Without including the interaction 
effects, the results in Model 1 do not provide evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
between corporate social action before a boycott and the change after a boycott, nor is there a 
significant relationship between a firm‟s reputation and change in the number of disclsures. 
However, when controlling for the interaction effect between base CSA and reputation included 
in Models 2 and 4, the effects of both reputation and base CSA become negative and significant.  
These findings directly refute Hypothesis 2, while supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4.  The findings 
indicate that the main effects of reputation and base CSA are conditional on the interaction 
between the two variables.  
 
The negative main effect of base CSA may reflect a capacity problem facing firms that do a lot 
of social action.  Firms that are already expending significant resources on social action may find 
it difficult to increase their disclosure activity when threatened.  The effect may not be due to a 
lack of motivation, but rather a lack of capacity to do additional social action. Consistent with 
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Hypothesis 4, however, we find that the effect of reputation becomes more positive among firms 
that have disclosed much social action in the past. This finding suggests that the base CSA 
positively moderates the effect of reputation on changes in the number of disclosures.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
For clarity, we‟ve graphed the predicted change in social action disclosures depending on the 
reputation of the firm and base CSA in Figure 2.  The figure shows that reputation is negatively 
associated with change in the number of disclosures for firms that had few social action-related 
disclosures in the six months prior to a boycott, but reputation becomes positively correlated 
with the change in disclosures for firms at higher levels of pre-boycott social action disclosures.  
The findings suggest that firms that were above average (mean = 3.3) in their use of social action 
and above average in their reputation (mean = 1.4) were especially likely to increase their use of 
social action following a boycott. Firms that have strong positive reputation without actively 
engaging in many social action-related disclosures will rely on their reputation to buffer their 
image from the negative consequences of the boycott, but as the level of base CSA increases – 
that is, as the expressed past commitment to social action increases – firms with strong 
reputations are compelled to respond by disclosing even more social action after a boycott.  Such 
a finding supports our expectation that firms respond to image threats using social action when it 
is associated with positive reputation.  The audiences of these firms have come to value social 
action as core to their identities. The past commitments to social action make it an integral tool in 
the firm‟s image repertoire.   And these organizations, with valuable intangible assets resting on 
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their image of virtuosity, are especially motivated to go to great lengths to protect their image of 
virtuosity when it is challenged.     
 
[Insert Figure 2 about Here] 
 
In addition, Model 1 demonstrates a significant positive effect of a boycott‟s media attention on 
the change in its target‟s disclosure activity after a boycott.  The main effect of the target‟s 
change in reputation is not independently significantly associated with the change in corporate 
social responsibility activity. However, when controlling for the interaction between media 
attention and change in reputation in Models 3 and 4, both media attention and reputation have 
significant main effects.  Thus, our results provide robust support for Hypothesis 5 and some 
support for Hypothesis 6.  The interaction between media attention and reputation is also 
significant and positively associated with the change in social action disclosures after a boycott.   
This finding is consistent with the expectation that organizational response by increased social 
action is predicated on both the focus of organizational actors and the elements of the situation in 
which the focus takes place, providing robust support for Hypothesis 7.   This interaction is 
depicted in Figure 3.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about Here] 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the predicted change in social action disclosures increases more with 
each successive newspaper report about the boycott for firms that had recent reputation 
increases. Firms one standard deviation above the reputation change mean have much higher 
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rates of post-boycott changes in social action than firms at the mean or one standard deviation 
below the mean, and this gap increases at higher levels of media attention. To the extent that 
media attention captures the salience of the image threat, the result implies that firms 
experiencing recent reputation gains are much more likely to take proactive solutions to image 
threats, amplifying the distinguishing characteristics of the company that merit its newly won 
esteemed position. The finding is especially interesting when compared to King‟s (2008) 
analysis, which showed that firms were more likely to concede to boycotts when experiencing a 
reputation decline. Taken together, the results indicate that firms may respond proactively, 
seeking to emphasize the company‟s inherent virtue, after a recent reputation increase; however, 
after recent reputation declines, the response to an image threat is more reactive. Firms in a 
reputation loss condition may simply find it less troublesome for their image to give in to the 
demands of boycotters than fight the image threat with contradictory, positively enhancing 
images. 
 
In models not shown here, we also controlled for whether or not firms conceded to the 
boycotters‟ demands, but we found no significant relationship between concessions and 
increased social action.  Further, the base correlation between direct concession and the change 
in social action after a threat is less than 0.01.  This suggests that direct and indirect responses 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather, direct concessions to social movement activists and the 
indirect image work needed to maintain favorable audience impressions may be supplementary 
responses used to ameliorate an extra-institutional image threat.   
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The regression results for the model predicting the likelihood of suffering a reputation decline 
after being boycotted are reported in Table 4.  Hypothesis 8 – that firms that increase their CSA 
disclosures in the wake of a boycott will be less likely to suffer reputational damage after the 
boycott – is supported.  We find a significant negative relationship between the change in the 
number of corporate social activities disclosed after a boycott and the likelihood of a reputational 
decline in the two years following the boycott.
4
  Interestingly, we find that firms are more likely 
to suffer reputational damage when the boycott is waged over an environmental issue, suggesting 
that these issues may carry more stigmatic weight with key stakeholders.   We also find a 
significant positive relationship between media attention and reputation damage, suggesting that 
boycotts that receive more media attention are more likely to do long term reputational damage 
to their targets.  This model suggests that increased corporate social activity may indeed help to 
quell the image threat induced by external activists and lessen the likelihood of long term 
reputational damage. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Several recent contributions to the study of social movements have documented the potential for 
well-orchestrated social movements to coerce corporations into making policy changes in line 
with their demands.  For example, a substantial literature has accumulated demonstrating the 
consequences of movements for policy change (e.g., McCammon et al. 2001; Soule and Olzak 
2004; Soule and King 2006), cultural and identity transformation (e.g., Armstrong 2002; 
                                                          
4
 In supplementary analysis we do not find that responding to a boycott with increased social action increases the 
likelihood of a reputational gain. In this respect, ameliorating the image threat with social action disclosures merely 
serves to buffer the firm from potential negative reputational feedback. 
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Bernstein 2005), the creation of new markets (e.g., Weber, Heinze, and De Soucey 2008; Sine 
and Lee 2009) and organizational policy changes (e.g., Weber et al. 2009; Schurman and Munro 
2009).  However, in this paper we suggest that social movements may additionally influence 
their organizational targets in a more indirect way, by provoking an image threat that prompts 
targets to engage in impression management meant to appeal to their general audiences.   We 
show that movement targets‟ use of social disclosures is frequently a response to social 
movements because it reinforces positive audience expectations and buffers the organization 
from the potential image threat set in motion by the movement. When organizations have built a 
positive reputation by fostering an image of virtuosity through the active employment of social 
initiatives, they will respond to image threats by doing even more social activity. Thus, 
promulgated images that depict an organization unfavorably may spur reputable firms to go to 
extraordinary lengths to demonstrate their virtuosity. They accentuate those identity 
characteristics that favorably distinguish them. When firms do not have a history of “doing 
good” -- or when that history has not crystallized into a positive reputation -- they are less likely 
to respond to image threats with increased social activity.  Our findings, thus, indicate a clear 
causal mechanism between intensified efforts by movements to target for-profit firms and 
increased efforts in the corporate sphere to appear socially responsible (Soule 2009). 
 
Importantly, although we argue that corporate social activity is useful as an impression 
management tool, the social activities of most firms extend beyond purely symbolic „fluff.‟  
Social activities often impose significant costs and demand long-term commitments from the 
companies undertaking them.  Moreover, as we have argued throughout the paper, social 
disclosures create audience expectations that the organization will continue to support social 
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issues, which may impose long-term costs and commitments on the firm.  Although these 
commitments are costly for the firm, increased corporate social activities carry the potential to 
engender substantial benefits for society.  Our findings further indicate that increased social 
activity has practical effects on the organization‟s long term stakeholder relationships, as it is 
positively associated with the preservation of an organization‟s reputation after an image attack. 
 
Our study contributes to social movements literature by enriching our understanding of strategic 
interaction of movement actors and the organizations they seek to influence, as movements and 
targets vie over the socio-political legitimacy of corporate behavior (McAdam 1983; Ingram, 
Rao and Yue, 2010).  Specifically, our findings highlight targets‟ tendency to engage in 
impression management as a general mechanism that explains how movements influence their 
organizational targets.  While many studies have looked at aggregate uses of tactics within one 
movement (e.g., Olzak and Uhrig 2001), our study focuses on a single tactic – the boycott – used 
in a cross-section of social movements. Past research on boycotts has emphasized their role in 
disrupting sales and organizational routines (e.g., Friedman 1985; Pruitt and Friedman 1986; 
Pruitt, Wei and White 1988). This depiction of boycotts is congruent with a more general view of 
movement tactics as functioning through a disruptive mechanism (Rojas 2006), although it 
provides an important nuance to the explanation. Movement tactics are often thought to be 
effective because they disrupt organizational routines or stability, making it difficult for elites to 
reproduce their social positions and political power (Piven and Cloward 1977; Skrentny 2006) or 
increasing the costs of carrying out normal business (Luders 2006).  Our conceptualization 
suggests that movement effectiveness is more complex and situational. Rather than focusing on 
routines or elite‟s control over resources, we suggest that scholars should pay more attention to 
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the affective qualities of collective actors (e.g., identity and reputation), the relationship of 
movement targets to their core audiences, and the situational elements that make some 
movement tactics more salient or threatening.  
 
Our findings support the idea that organizational targets are complex structures with actor-like 
qualities.   Organizations are likely to act on past commitments made to their various audiences 
and aspire to meet the expectations that valued audiences create for them based on those 
commitments. Through this ongoing interaction between organization and audience, an 
organizational identity develops that has long-term impact on the behavior of the organization. 
This paper assesses one implication of this “presentation of self” (Goffman 1959) – the 
systematic responses of organizations facing an external image threat. The past commitments of 
an organization condition the kinds of responses that an organizational target will have to a 
movement threat. Movement scholars should continue to explore the ways in which movements 
create image threats, forcing their targets to respond by engaging in impression management 
with their audiences. We suggest that this ongoing project of impression management is a sorely 
ignored aspect of movement-target interaction.  Impression management should be relevant in 
every context in which movements offer challenges to elites, including the policymaking domain 
where elites‟ identities and reputations are consequential to personal and collective efficacy.  
Seen in this light, social movements are a kind of reputational entrepreneur who actively 
cultivate and threaten to undermine targets‟ images (Fine 1996). 
 
The findings also point to the importance of situational effects on target responses to image 
threats created by social movements. As actors actively engaged in impression management, 
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organizational targets are most likely to respond to attempted character attacks when the threat is 
perceived as real and when emboldened due to recent positive returns to their reputation. Our 
findings suggest, then, that increased corporate social activity may be seen as the most viable 
response to image threat when the organization is in a good position to defend its character. 
When a firm‟s reputation is rising and a perceived threat is made against its character, the firm is 
simply better positioned to defend its virtue; whereas when a firm has recently suffered 
reputational declines, it may be in a weak defensive position. Other responsive tactics might be 
better suited at that point (e.g., conceding to the boycotters‟ demands) and the firm may opt to 
simply make the threat go away altogether rather than fight the negative perceptions mounted by 
the agitators. Additionally, if the attack is not seen as very threatening (i.e., the boycott lacks 
media attention), then the firm sees little need to respond in any way (King 2008). These studies, 
together, suggest that social movement scholars ought to explore further the connection between 
the situational context of an image threat and the various responses that movement targets might 
have to that threat.  Clearly, movements may respond in a variety of ways to a boycott or any 
other movement tactic. Future research ought to explore heterogeneity in target responses. 
 
In addition to making contributions to social movement theory, the paper contributes to 
organizational theory by demonstrating that firm‟s reactions are indeed embedded in the 
expectations held by audiences, but these expectations may vary from firm to firm, depending on 
the firm-specific commitments that the organization has made. Not all firms engage equally in 
social activity because they have either never done it before or because they do not have a 
reputation linked to it. The findings, therefore, challenge theorists to consider more seriously 
how the histories and identity characteristics of organizations matter in their interactions with the 
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broader environment. Organizational responses to the environment, we surmise, may be highly 
moderated by unique firm-level commitments and perceptions. Firms respond differently to 
threats in their environment, depending on their past commitments and audience expectations. In 
this way, our paper blends together assumptions from the new and old institutionalisms (Selznick 
1996).   
 
The analysis also suggests that social movement scholars ought to focus more on the ways in 
which both activists and their targets are engaged in ongoing impression management activities. 
The analysis points to the sensitivity of movement targets to image threats created by disruptive 
movement activities. Social movement scholars should, in general, pay more attention to these 
cultural, symbolic outcomes of movement activity. While much social movement research 
focuses on the material effects of movement tactics, the symbolic effects may be even more real 
and significant, especially when one considers movements‟ influence over markets (King and 
Pearce 2010), which are inherently grounded in symbolic understandings about what is valuable 
and appropriate. Inasmuch as reputation is one of those valued symbols that organizations 
embrace, the consequences of movement tactics may hinge on their ability to effectively disrupt 
the images firms communicate to their audiences and threaten their established reputations. 
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*Boycotts reported in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Chicago 
Tribune, and Los Angeles Times.   
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Figure 1: Issues most highly represented in corporate boycotts, 1990-
2005*
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Figure 2______________________________________________________________________ 
Graph of the Interaction Effect between the Effect of Reputation and Base CSR Activity on the 
Change in Corporate Social Activity after a Boycott 
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Figure 3______________________________________________________________________ 
Graph of the Interaction Effect between the Effect of Media Attention and Reputation Change on 
the Change in Corporate Social Activity after a Boycott 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Independent and Dependent Variables 
 
   Variable                     Mean      S.D.      1        2         3          4        5       6         7 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Change    |   1.024  3.73   1.0000  
2. Reputation|   1.370  1.14   0.1535*  1.0000  
3. Base CSA  |   1.664  1.02  -0.0068   0.2363*   1.0000  
4. RepChange |   0.303  0.93  -0.0041   0.3788*   0.0257    1.0000  
5. Media Att.|  -0.436  1.63   0.0655   0.1457    0.0716    0.0069   1.0000  
6. Total PR  |   5.879  4.97   0.0616   0.1755*   0.4013*   0.0194  -0.0324   1.0000 
7. Subsidiary|   0.363  0.48  -0.1748* -0.2015*  -0.0519    0.0302   0.0105  -0.0857    1.0000 
8. Ind. Tech |   0.727  0.26  -0.1322   0.2395*   0.2890*   0.0612   0.0747   0.4755*   0.0716  
9. Ind. Heal.|   0.024  0.15   0.0422  -0.0471   -0.0566   -0.0933  -0.0305   0.0384   -0.0403 
10.Ind. Fina.|   0.103  0.30  -0.0162   0.1814*   0.0697    0.0345   0.0694   0.1150    0.0497  
11.Ind. Ener |   0.109  0.31  -0.0319   0.0469   -0.1304   -0.0075  -0.0141  -0.1403   -0.2286*   
12.Ind. Media|   0.224  0.42   0.0303   0.1158   -0.0460    0.0938   0.1787* -0.0029    0.3597*  
13.Environ   |   0.109  0.31   0.2241*  0.0132    0.0875   -0.1545* -0.1095   0.0544   -0.1491   
14.Animals   |   0.024  0.15  -0.1275  -0.0471    0.0826    0.0771   0.1631   0.0239    0.0403  
15.Safety    |   0.006  0.08   0.0629   0.0443   -0.0336    0.1437   0.2607*  0.0016   -0.0599 
16.Labor     |   0.109  0.31   0.1092   0.0973    0.2723* -0.00495  -0.0021   0.0562   -0.0696  
17.Religious |   0.224  0.42  -0.0743  -0.0139   -0.1031    0.0418   0.1103   0.0109    0.0808  
18.Gender    |   0.036  0.19   0.0239   0.0152   -0.0422    0.1598*  0.0931   0.0414   -0.0385  
19.LogEmploy |   4.139  1.63   0.0758   0.3320*   0.3598*   0.0486   0.1193   0.1085    0.0592  
20.Cash      |  16.751 152.2   0.0170   0.1136   -0.0706   -0.0234  -0.0263  -0.0155   -0.0627  
21.Mark.2Book|   3.103 10.69   0.0347   0.1116   -0.0106    0.0061   0.0756   0.0463    0.0955 
 
 
             |      8          9         10       11        12        13        14        15 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
8. Ind. Tech.|  1.0000  
9. Ind. Heal.| -0.0433     1.0000  
10.Ind. Fina.|  0.2776*   -0.0541     1.0000  
11.Ind. Ener | -0.0961    -0.0541    -0.1200    1.0000  
12.Ind. Media|  0.1315    -0.0830     0.0481   -0.1841*   1.0000  
13.Environ   | -0.0214    -0.0541     0.0667    0.2533*  -0.1377    1.0000  
14.Animals   | -0.0433    -0.0244    -0.0541   -0.0721   -0.0830   -0.0541    1.0000  
15.Safety    | -0.0215    -0.0121    -0.0268    0.2234*  -0.0411   -0.0268    0.4955    1.0000 
16.Labor     |  0.0534    -0.0541    -0.0578   -0.1200   -0.0912   -0.1200   -0.0541   -0.0268 
17.Religious | -0.0395    -0.0844     0.0427   -0.1413    0.1933*  -0.1873*  -0.0844   -0.0418 
18.Gender    |  0.0578    -0.0326     0.0241    0.0241   -0.1108   -0.0722    0.1628*   0.3711* 
19.Log Employ|  0.1627*   -0.0135     0.1059   -0.0061   -0.0819    0.0418    0.0835   -0.0067 
20.Cash      | -0.0236    -0.0136     0.2282** -0.0156   -0.0453   -0.0223   -0.0093   -0.0060 
21.Mark.2Book|  0.0717     0.0761     0.0229   -0.0143    0.0534   -0.0052   -0.4008*  -0.0081 
 
 
             |    16       17       18       19       20       21 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
16.Labor     |  1.0000  
17.Religious |  0.1873*  1.0000  
18.Gender    | -0.0722  -0.1127   1.0000  
19.Log Employ|  0.1614* -0.0998  -0.1362   1.0000  
20.Cash      | -0.0273   0.1449  -0.0167   0.0527   1.0000 
21.Mark.2Book|  0.1389   0.0289  -0.0292   0.1192  -0.0078   1.0000 
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Table 2  
 
Probit Estimates for First-Stage Boycott Target Model 
 
Variables                                                                Coefficients                             Robust Standard Error 
 
Constant                              -0.658*                        0.31 
Boycotts of Firm in Past Year          0.422***                     0.095 
Boycotts of Industry in Past Year     0.0689*                       0.028          
Logged Total Assets                   -0.102**                      0.035 
Base CSA Activity (^1/2)               0.581***                     0.069                
Other PR Activity (^1/2)              0.0233                        0.014 
 
Observations                        652 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood              -716.82 
Fixed Effects for year included in the model but not recorded here. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3: Coefficients from the Second Stage in the Heckman Regression of the Change in 
the Number of Publicized Social Activities of Boycotted Firms, 1990-2005 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------    
                   Model 1          Model 2         Model 3        Model 4    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                       
Independent Variables 
Reputation         -0.255          -1.694***       -0.302          -1.582***  
                   (0.45)          (0.46)          (0.51)          (0.44)    
Baseline CSA       -1.079          -2.594***       -1.084          -2.353***    
                   (0.78)          (0.76)          (0.87)          (0.71)    
Reputation                          0.980**                         0.920** 
x Baseline CSA                     (0.35)                          (0.36)   
 
Reputation Change  0.0766           0.191           0.946*          0.923*    
                   (0.35)          (0.35)          (0.46)          (0.45)    
Media Attention     0.346*          0.284*          0.280**         0.236*    
                   (0.15)          (0.13)         (0.099)          (0.11)    
Media x Reputation                                  1.338***        1.184** 
Change                                             (0.39)          (0.39)    
 
Controls 
Total Other PR     0.0692          0.0951          0.0906           0.103 
                   (0.11)         (0.099)          (0.11)         (0.097) 
Subsidiary         -0.943          -1.131*         -0.990*         -1.181*  
                   (0.51)          (0.50)          (0.48)          (0.51)    
Ind. Technology    -3.405**        -3.999***       -3.701***       -4.182***  
                   (1.14)          (1.16)          (1.10)          (1.15)    
Ind. Health         2.014           2.586**         1.822           2.598**    
                   (1.44)          (0.96)          (1.54)          (1.01)    
Ind. Finance        0.128          -0.106          0.0392          -0.366    
                   (1.63)          (1.21)          (1.55)          (1.11)    
Ind. Media          0.170           0.274         -0.0111           0.124    
                   (0.63)          (0.62)          (0.60)          (0.59)    
Issue Environment   1.058           1.502           1.482           1.597    
                   (1.13)          (1.11)          (1.35)          (1.03)    
Issue Safety        3.695           4.252          -9.301*         -7.274    
                   (3.06)          (2.68)          (4.23)          (4.42)   
Issue Labor         1.849           1.547           2.141           1.636    
                   (1.21)          (0.86)          (1.75)          (0.89)    
Issue Animals      -2.976          -2.960          -5.521*         -5.036*    
                   (2.62)          (2.58)          (2.65)          (2.39)    
Issue Religious    -0.247          -0.374          -0.264          -0.419 
                   (0.49)          (0.48)          (0.60)          (0.51) 
Issue Gender        4.429***        4.638***        4.155***        4.276*** 
                   (1.26)          (1.19)          (1.17)          (1.10) 
Log Employees       0.457           0.544*          0.438           0.478*    
                   (0.28)          (0.23)          (0.31)          (0.22)    
Cash              0.00531***      0.00631***      0.00510**       0.00581***    
                 (0.0015)        (0.0012)        (0.0016)        (0.0013) 
Market to Book    -0.0745*        -0.0847***      -0.0850*        -0.0878*** 
Ratio             (0.030)         (0.023)         (0.042)         (0.022) 
   
Selection          -1.62     -1.50**        -1.81    -1.43** 
Correction Effect  (1.25)    (0.51)      (1.39)        (0.49) 
Constant            6.097           7.067***        6.984*          7.263***    
                   (3.74)          (1.90)          (3.37)          (1.85)  
Observations  165     165        165    165 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Fixed Effects for year included in the model but not recorded here. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4: Coefficients for the Probit Regression of Post-boycott Reputational Decline on 
Independent Variables 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Change in CSA count -.10** .03 
Reputation (original) 1.51*** .23 
Baseline CSA  .23 .16 
Past reputational change  -.07 .32 
Media attention .32* .13 
Other PR (total) .0003 .0005 
Subsidiary -.46 .29 
Ind. Technology -.43 .44 
Ind. Health 2.55*** .93 
Ind. Finance .35 .36 
Ind. Media -.62 .58 
Issue - Environment 1.25* .62 
Issue - Labor .66 .47 
Issue - Morality -.59 .38 
Log of employees -.06 .09 
Free cash flow -.09* .04 
Market to book ratio -.08† .05 
Constant -1.79** .67 
Observations 162   
Log likelihood -48.36   
 
†p<.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, 
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